To what extent was the trusteeship system born out of the sincere and honest desire to ‘bring the benefits of civilisation to all those who do not yet enjoy it’?

The debate over whether it was born out of the sincere and honest desire to ‘bring the benefits of civilisation to all those who do not yet enjoy it’, essentially revolves around whether trusteeship is (as stated in the lecture) ‘a real concern for the welfare of independent peoples’ or simply a proclaimed humanitarianism used as a window dressing of self motivated actions.

On one hand the idea of trusteeship holds an idea of a “standard of civilisation” (Paris 2002:650). If there is a belief in a standard of some sort there is the expectation that such a standard must be met. This standard was seen as a European responsibility and was articulated at the Berlin Conference on Africa in 1885 where colonial powers agreed to “bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being” (Paris 2002:651). In this conference it appears that there was a sincere desire. However it is nearly impossible to correctly speculate as to the actual intentions of these European colonial powers.

It is a common idea in contemporary studies that trusteeship is seen as simply a way to disguise self interest and economically motivated actions within developing states. In this sense trusteeship relies on the fundamental idea of inequality. This idea of inequality can lead to a sense of responsibility and the ‘white man’s burden’. However this idea and sense of inequality can also distance the trusteeship state from its ‘dependents’. This can aid in justifying economically self interested motivations and their actions.

To a large degree the debate over the original intentions of trusteeship is problematic as it relies heavily upon a speculation of actual versus proclaimed intentions.

To what extent was the trusteeship system born out of the sincere and honest desire to ‘bring the benefits of civilisation to all those who do not yet enjoy it’?

The debate over whether it was born out of the sincere and honest desire to ‘bring the benefits of civilisation to all those who do not yet enjoy it’, essentially revolves around whether trusteeship is (as stated in the lecture) ‘a real concern for the welfare of independent peoples’ or simply a proclaimed humanitarianism used as a window dressing of self motivated actions.

On one hand the idea of trusteeship holds an idea of a “standard of civilisation” (Paris 2002:650). If there is a belief in a standard of some sort there is the expectation that such a standard must be met. This standard was seen as a European responsibility and was articulated at the Berlin Conference on Africa in 1885 where colonial powers agreed to “bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being” (Paris 2002:651). In this conference it appears that there was a sincere desire. However it is nearly impossible to correctly speculate as to the actual intentions of these European colonial powers.

It is a common idea in contemporary studies that trusteeship is seen as simply a way to disguise self interest and economically motivated actions within developing states. In this sense trusteeship relies on the fundamental idea of inequality. This idea of inequality can lead to a sense of responsibility and the ‘white man’s burden’. However this idea and sense of inequality can also distance the trusteeship state from its ‘dependents’. This can aid in justifying economically self interested motivations and their actions.

To a large degree the debate over the original intentions of trusteeship is problematic as it relies heavily upon a speculation of actual versus proclaimed intentions.

Peacekeeping should be privatised because private companies, military and otherwise, are more likely to foster peace and prosperity. Discuss.

 

The argument that “peacekeeping should be privatised because private companies, military and otherwise, are more likely to foster peace and prosperity” is true to some extent, however the form and extent of peace and prosperity must be measured against the legitimacy of private companies and the international atmosphere such a dimension of privatisation creates.

Bellamy and Williams in Understanding Peacekeeping illustrate the complexities of a privatised peacekeeping mission through the example of the international problem of Rwandan Refugees fleeing into Zaire after the 1994 genocide. Bellamy and Williams state that a private company offered to provide “training and logistical support” (Bellamy and Williams 2010: 327). However this offer was rejected, on the bases of high costs and principles. These principles on which privatisation were rejected can be assumed to be the weighty issues of sovereignty and representation. These issues are important to the functioning of the international community and should not be dismissed as irrelevant. However it is important to note that the UN did not send a peacekeeping force to Zaire at all. Rather than simply rejecting privatisation in favour of a UN lead force, a complete lack of action became the favourable alternative.



This active decision by the UN placed principles of sovereignty and representation above the possible effectiveness of private companies. However the effectiveness of the private companies should not be ignored simply in favour of abidance of international norms and expectations. It is argued that private companies have a greater interest in quick resolutions and establishment of peace because of their reliance on happy costumers. Singer gives the changing state of globalisation as a reason for a shift to privatisation, thus showing privatisation to be a type of evolution matching the evolution in globalisation (Singer 2001). The privatisation of peacekeeping creates a great inducement for the actors to achieve peace and prosperity.





Although the privatisation of peacekeeping can obtain results quicker than other forms of peacekeeping, it is debateable whether these benefits outweigh the costs to the public community, a loss in sovereignty and representation and a change in international norms.

To what extent is Duffield’s “the changing aid paradigm” a useful concept?

 

Duffield’s “changing aid paradigm” is a useful concept to the extent that it articulates changes in the international community’s response to certain situations within political theory framework. Duffield’s article is just as complex as the new paradigm he is trying to explain. Although this broad approach can be confusing at times, it reflects the integration of multiple groups and practices that is this changing paradigm.

The underlying concept of this “changing aid paradigm” is the current state of development, in particular, the polarisation of development. This can be seen in two ways, firstly the wealth gap between the richest and poorest areas of the world. Secondly Duffield states there are, “two contradictory developments: complex forms of economic and political integration within the main bloc areas, as opposed to ethnocentric or fundamentalist assertion or breakdown outside” (Duffield 1997: 529). This reflects the differing states of development throughout the world, particularly in relation to regionalisation.

The importance of this concept is shown by Duffield throughout his article, in particular the effects of this changing paradigm on activities of NGOs. A current example of this is the case of refugees. Duffield explains that there is a tendency to view cases of refugees from the perspective of receiving states, rather than the states from which refugees come. However as part of this changing paradigm there has been a shift of focus. The focus has been on aiding the conflict states in securing a safe environment for their citizens (Duffield 1997:530). This new focus can be seen as a result in a shift towards an understanding of different regions developing at a different pace.

It is in cases such as this that Duffield’s changing aid paradigm become useful as it places the new response to development situations within a theoretical framework which can better articulate such a change.

What were the problems caused by the mandate to U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia?

The differences between the mandate of U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia and the achievable actions of the peacekeepers caused a series of problems for the peacekeepers of UNPROFOR II.

UNSCR770 authorised the use of force under Chapter VII (of the UN charter), only for the distribution of humanitarian aid. This caused a series of problems. Firstly, this was problematic because it did not match the RoE of the contributing states in relation to the use of force. As explained in previous lectures, the RoE of peacekeepers are determined by the individual states contributing peacekeepers to the mission. This became problematic for UNPROFOR, as the RoE determined by these states further restricted peacekeepers to a state of minimum use of force only in self defence. This created problems for the enforcement of the UN’s humanitarian mandate. Another problem caused by this narrow mandate was the inability of peacekeepers to address the problems of ethnic cleansing that were growing. Peacekeepers were able to save thounsands of Bosnians from starvation but were unable to address the ethnic cleansing that was occurring because of the restrictions to their mandate.

It should be understood that the mandate did change to include the protection of civilians. In June 1993 the Mandate was extended under UNSCR836, to include the protection the already established safe zones. This resolution authorized (in addition to UNSCR770) the use of force in reply to attacks on safe areas and humanitarian convoys etc. However this was problematic as the peacekeepers in Bosnia did not have the military means to undertake such actions.

Although the mandate to UN peacekeepers on Bosnia did change and become broader, especially in relation to the use of force, problems remained for the UN peacekeepers in Bosnia. A combination of restricting RoE and a lack of physical ability meant that the mandates given by the UN became a problem and a disproportionate burden for the peacekeepers in Bosnia.

The Use of Force?

 

The use of force by UN peacekeepers has the tendency to become counterproductive. This is not to say that counter productivity is unavoidable, but rather harder to prevent. There have been multiple incidents where the use of force by UN peacekeepers has become counterproductive such as the in the ONUC, Somalia, and UNPROFOR.


This counterproductive influence through the use of force may be best examined in relation to the Holy Trinity of peace keeping. As outlined frequently the Holy Trinity of is consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force. Because of the obvious implications on minimum use of force I will examine the relationship between the use of force and consent and impartiality.

UN peacekeeping requires the consent of the warring parties to intervene. This consent is given based on a strict mandate, although some mandates include the use of force in their opening mandate, others, such as ONUC; require a re-interpretation of the original mandate. ONUC was authorised with a minimal use of force mandate, however as the mission progressed the use of force was re-interpreted and eventually the mandate itself was amended (Chesterman 2004:7). This calls into question the continued consent of the warring parties, having given consent for a Holy Trinity peacekeeping force; it would be hard to later deny the changes to mandate.

Despite any degree or lack of force, impartiality in peacekeeping can be hard to maintain. This is especially the case in internal conflicts. If UN peacekeepers were to use force “directly or indirectly, against one of the parties, then it has taken sides in the civil war and is inevitably perceived as being at best, partial and, at worst, a combatant” (Goulding 1996:14). An example of this can be seen with UNPROFOR where despite the Security Council’s attempt in wording to remain impartial the actions of the peacekeepers became increasingly partial. Indeed the events in Somalia led to (as the lecture stated) the Peacekeepers being seen as the 16th clan, a combatant, in the conflict.

Although the use of force can prove successful in other forms of missions such as peace enforcement, history has show that it has been negative, even counterproductive in peace keeping.

What is the nature of warlordism and why does it pose such a significant challenge to peace operations?

Warlordism is the control of a military leader within a certain area, primarily acting without legitimate international authority. In particular relation to this week’s topic, Warlordism is considered a key characteristic of ‘New Wars’ (Bellamy and Williams 2010:94).

Warlordism is heavily associated with war economics. Berdal states that in both Liberia and Sierra Leone “a struggle among warlords for control of the state has carried with it substantial and direct economic benefits” (Berdal 2003:485). An example of this can be seen in the career of Liberian Charles Taylor who was estimated to have earned $.75 million US per year, between the years of 1990-94, through actions aided by the conflict situation (Berdal 2003:485).

This economic interest poses a significant challenge to peace operations; as such actors have an interest in the continuation of the conflict as seen in the Cambodian case of Ieng Sary. Keen explained one of the challenges in persuading key leaders in conflicts to a resolution is compromising so that those who were profiting from the continuation of the conflict are persuaded that they will continue to profit in peace (Keen2001:12). Thus there is a need for peace operations provide an incentive for these parties to move towards peace. However as “warlords are quite literally, businessmen of war, wielding violence as the main instrument of their economic activity” (Bredal 2003:485) chance of success of this persuasion.

Warlordism poses a significant challenge to peace operations through the between the warlords lack of legitimacy and the real influence such Warlords hold within conflict zones. Undertaking negotiations of peace with warlords creates further problems as it can add legitimacy to the warlord’s control (Bellamy and Williams 2010:200), giving legitimacy to a main cause of the conflict which the peace operation is trying to end.

Although there are many other challenges posed by warlordism, it is the invested interests of these different actors which pose significant challenge for peace operations.

Who is the best peacekeeper?

Although it is hard to determine the ‘best’ peacekeeper, I would venture to say that the best peacekeeper would be a coalition of the willing with UN approval and mandate.

In order to decide who the best peacekeeper is it is important to look both at the legitimacy with which the peacekeeper enters the field and the efficiency of the peacekeeper in achieving its mandate. To ignore either of these areas would be unbalanced. The best peacekeeper is one who manages to best accommodate these two areas.

Of course the peacekeeper with the highest legitimacy is the UN. Bellamy and Williams in Understanding Peacekeeping (2010) insist that the UN holds the highest legitimacy. In many regards this is because of the international standing held by the UN. However the UN struggles with efficiency and effectiveness. Bellamy and Williams highlight the difficulties involved in organising a UN led peacekeeping force. They explain the long process resulting in the lack of efficiency in organising the force for each mission.

In comparison a coalition of the willing is more efficient in organising such forces (Bellamy and Williams 2005:169), while still holding some legitimacy of its own. This is the primary balance that coalitions benefit from rather than a unilateral action, “pivotal states constructed coalitions to serve two primary functions: share the material costs of the operation... and provide a degree of legitimisation” (Bellamy and Williams 2005:169). This balance can be seen in the Australian led coalition to the Solomon Islands.

Despite the legitimacy lent by a joint action, this pales in comparison to the legitimacy given by the UN. However if these coalitions of the willing were to act under supervision UN, with a UN approved mandate this would effectively increase the legitimacy of such a force while maintaining the efficiency of a coalition of the willing.

Which type of peace operation do you think has been the most effective throughout UN history and why?

 

To state that a single peace operation has been the most effective throughout UN history is decidedly problematic, rather different operations are most effective in different circumstances. To illustrate this point I will examine both traditional peacekeeping and peace support operations.



Traditional peacekeeping has proven to be effective in situations in which the ‘Holy Trinity’ is found. In missions such as UNSCOB (Greece 1947-51), traditional peacekeeping appeared to be effective. The circumstances of this mission adhered greatly to the consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force, of the ‘Holy Trinity’. UNSCOB. The political situation of Greece suited this traditional form of peacekeeping (Bellamy et al 2004:98). In these circumstances UNSCOB was able to claim clear consent and remaining impartial and using minimal use of force was a clearer decision. However success with traditional peacekeeping is not always the case. In missions such as UNMOGIP and UNTSO traditional peace keeping proved less effective. As Kofi Anan stated “the prerequisites of traditional peacekeeping will not exist in the majority of cases. If the UN has no other method at its disposal, it will become largely irrelevant” (Wilkinson 2000:63).



An alternative to traditional peacekeeping is peace support operations. In intra-state conflict the distinction of the ‘Holy Trinity’ becomes less pronounced and thus the mandate of the UN force unclear. In these circumstances peace support operations are multifaceted missions which allow for movement between traditional peacekeeping methods other methods without changing the essential mandates of the operation (Wilkinson 2000:66). An example of this is KFOR in Kosovo; this mission has undergone many changes shifting to include UNSC resolutions(NATO KFOR ) which would have required major adjustments to the mission if it was limited to traditional peacekeeping.



In conclusion, it is not clear whether there is a ‘most effective’ form of peacekeeping, rather it appears that the different forms of peace keeping are each most effective in different circumstances.

Should the UN go back to basics?

 

From the institution of the United Nations’ peacekeeping there have been constant developments of this peacekeeping format. Branching away from the traditional peacekeeping efforts of positioning between conflicting sides in order to monitor a ceasefire, UN peacekeeping has evolved to include multidimensional peace keeping; humanitarian interventions; and peace enforcement. However developments such as seen in Bosnia and Somalia induced calls for a return to the basic goals for UN peacekeeping of cease fires.

However calling for a return to basics implies that the UN is simply going past the boundaries it was given. Instead some consideration should be given to the needs of the international community. The Bosnian experience saw UN peacekeepers act on 80 Security Council resolutions performing the complicated negotiation between consent and dissuading use of military force (Gray 2001:57). Circumstances such as this require new approaches to peace keeping while adhering to the fundamentals.

A return to the basics seems in many regards like the logical step, for UN peacekeepers have been both efficient and successful in aiding cease fires and fulfilling the role of traditional peacekeeping. Gray drew attention to the rapidly changing roles of UN Peacekeepers stating that, “if UN peacekeeping has acquired a certain elasticity in recent years, it is precisely because circumstances have lead the world to make demands on the military capacity of the United Nations which vastly exceeds anything it was called upon to do as recently as three or four years ago” (Gray 2001:53). However this does not mean that peacekeeping should evolve until it is unrecognisable (Gray 2001:56). Peacekeeping should have the essential element of consent. Without this ‘basic’ guiding principle the evolution of peacekeeping would be without foundation.

I believe that the UN should not go back to basics for although the UN is successful in traditional peacekeeping, the international community have greater expectations and indeed needs which cannot be fulfilled through the limited goals of traditional peacekeeping. Because the international community requires greater efforts by the UN forces, returning to the basics would ignore the ways in which the world has changed and the new needs it has created.

I haven't been Blogging? Think what you like!

Some may think that I haven't really been 'into' blogging over the last 6 months. Indeed this blog has become rather neglected, HOWEVER I've really been blogging more than I ever have!

You see for one of my classes this last semester I had to participate in a weekly blog about various aspects of international peacekeeping, everything from Genocide to PMC (Private Military Corporations). Each week I was given a question to respond to in 300 words (or there abouts :)

So without further ado let me introduce you to International Peacekeeping, Blogs By Jesse.